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Employment Law 
Proving Racial and Gender Bias Under Title VII 
 




Law professors have proclaimed that implicit bias is the most 
prominent form of bias today, and that Title VII is ill-equipped to 
address it. Drawing on deep research in social science, this 
Chapter shows that conceptualizing bias as unconscious or 
implicit is not helpful in the legal context, and that Title VII is up 
to the challenge of addressing bias. 
Hundreds of experimental studies in the past forty years have 
documented five basic patterns of racial and gender bias. The 
Achilles’ heel in these studies, however, is that many experiments 
occur in social-psychology labs. Do they describe what actually 
goes on at work? My research shows that they do. The Workplace 
Experiences Survey, which has now been taken by over 18,000 
people in different industries, shows that the same five patterns of 
racial and gender bias documented in experimental studies are 
reported in workplaces. Once the focus shifts from the inner 
workings of cognitive processing to what actually happens on the 
ground, well-established legal theories under Title VII can be 
applied in a straightforward way. 
This Chapter describes the five basic patterns of bias and 
argues that expert testimony should not be required to prove them 
in court. Any reasonable jury will be able to recognize if they have 
occurred because each pattern has been widely disseminated in 
popular culture. Extensive examples are given. 
The Chapter also explores the implications of Bostock v. 
Clayton County2 for so-called “intersectional plaintiffs,” such as 
women of color, who experience bias based on both race and 
gender. Bostock loosened Title VII’s causation requirement, 
holding that a plaintiff’s sex or race need not “be the sole or 
 
1 Excerpted and adapted from Joan C. Williams, Rachel M. Korn & Sky 
Mihaylo, Beyond Implicit Bias: Litigating Race and Gender Employment 
Discrimination Using Data from the Workplace Experiences Survey, 72 
HASTINGS L.J. 337 (2020).  
2 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
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primary cause of an adverse employment action for Title VII 
liability to follow.”3 This language, combined with data from the 
Workplace Experiences Survey, provides a clear path for 
analyzing Title VII cases involving women of color and other 
intersectional plaintiffs. Bostock also provides important 
precedent in cases involving discrimination against mothers. 
Finally, the Chapter surveys forty years of social science to 
provide important insight into two common employer defenses in 
Title VII cases: the same-actor defense and the personal-animosity 
defense. The same-actor defense posits that the same person who 
hired the plaintiff would not then discriminate against them. 
Social science shows why this assumption often is factually 
incorrect. Social science also undermines the validity of the 
personal-animosity defense—that an adverse employment action 
stems not from bias but from personal dislike; in fact, prescriptive 
bias is often expressed as dislike. 
 
The Five Patterns of Racial and Gender Bias 
 
The field of social psychology has literally hundreds of bias 
studies that place people in workplace scenarios. In addition, 
many social psychologists and behavioral economists have 
conducted experiments in actual workplaces.4 These experiments 
provide overwhelming evidence of five basic patterns of 
workplace bias. The Workplace Experiences Survey shows that 
workers report these same five patterns of bias occurring in their 
actual workplaces today. The five basic patterns are these: 
 
1. Prove It Again.5 In predominantly white workplaces, 
people of color don’t seem a natural fit, so they often need to prove 
 
3 Id. at 405.  
4 E.g., Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is 
There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIO. 1297, 1333 (2007); 
John A. List & Andreas Leibbrandt, Do Women Avoid Salary 
Negotiations? Evidence From a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment, 
61 MGMT. SCI. 2016 (2014); Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio, 
Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark J. Graham & Jo Handelsman, Science 
Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 16474 (2012).  
5 The technical names for the types of bias that feed the prove-it-again 
effect include in-group favoritism, descriptive stereotyping, leniency 
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themselves more than white people do. In workplaces where men 
predominate in positions of power, women don’t seem as natural 
a fit, so they need to prove themselves more than men do. Prove-
it-again bias has been documented repeatedly since at least the 
1950s.6 Data from the Workplace Experiences Survey show that 
prove-it-again bias is pervasive for both women and people of 
color, and that women of color report it more often than any other 
group.7 Prove-it-again bias shows up most commonly as follows: 
 
• Equally competent women or people of color are less 
likely to be hired, less likely to be promoted, and 
generally held to higher standards than their white male 
peers; their work may be more scrutinized. 
• The mistakes of white men are treated more leniently (“it 
could happen to anyone”) while mistakes made by women 
and people of color are noticed more, remembered longer, 
and prove costlier in terms of career trajectory. 
• The successes of white men are more likely to be noticed, 
remembered longer, and attributed to stable internal 
causes like skill, while the successes of women and 
people of color are less likely to be noticed and more often 
attributed to unstable external causes like luck. 
 
bias, attribution bias, and confirmation bias. For a thorough review of 
the literature on prove-it-again bias, see Williams et al., supra note 1. 
6 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954). 
7 See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, SU LI, ROBERTA RINCON & PETER FINN, 
CLIMATE CONTROL: GENDER AND RACIAL BIAS IN ENGINEERING? 112 
(WorkLife Law 2016) (study of engineers); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, 
KATHERINE W. PHILLIPS & ERIKA V. HALL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY? GENDER 
BIAS AGAINST WOMEN IN SCIENCE 53 (WorkLife Law 2014) (study of 
science professors); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, MARINA MULTHAUP, SU LI & 
RACHEL KORN, YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE: 
INTERRUPTING RACIAL & GENDER BIAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (ABA 
2018) (lawyers study); JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL KORN, THE 
ELEPHANT IN THE (WELL-DESIGNED) ROOM: A STUDY OF GENDER AND 
RACIAL BIAS IN THE PROFESSION OF ARCHITECTURE (forthcoming 2021) 
(study of architects); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RACHEL M. KORN & RACHEL 
MAAS, PINNING DOWN THE JELLYFISH: WOMEN OF COLOR IN TECH 
(working paper studying tech).  
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• Women and people of color are much more likely than 
white men to report that others get credit for ideas they 
originally offered, a.k.a. “the stolen idea.”  
 
2. Tightrope.8 Workplaces typically reward people who are 
authoritative and ambitious, but women who behave that way 
often are seen as difficult, abrasive, and not team player. Behavior 
that would be seen as a mere quirk or a career-enhancing passion 
for the business in a white man may be seen as angry if the 
individual is Black, emotional if Hispanic, or sly and 
untrustworthy if Asian. Asian-American women are most likely 
to report backlash for authoritative behavior. Tightrope bias 
commonly shows up in the following situations: 
 
• In hiring and performance evaluations, women and people 
of color are more likely to be faulted for personality 
problems than white men are. In some workplaces, people 
of color do not thrive unless they are non-threatening and 
well-liked, a.k.a. the teddy-bear effect, while white men’s 
foibles and personalities are given broad rein.9  
• Anger and self-promotion are much more readily 
accepted from white men than from any other group. So 
is expertise: female experts may be disliked unless they 
present their opinions in a warm and deferential way.10 
• Data from the Workplace Experiences Survey shows that 
white men report, at extraordinarily high levels (between 
80% and 90%), fair access to career-enhancing 
assignments. Women and people of color are often 
expected to be worker bees, not ambitious go-getters, and 
report much lower rates of access to career-enhancing 
 
8 The technical name for tightrope bias is prescriptive stereotyping. It has 
been documented since the 1970s chiefly in the gender context, although 
there are some studies on race, too. For a thorough review of the 
literature on tightrope bias, see Williams et al., supra note 1. 
9 Robert W. Livingston & Nicholas A. Pearce, The Teddy-Bear Effect: 
Does Having a Baby Face Benefit Black Chief Executive Officers?, 20 
PSYCH. SCI. 1229, 1232 (2009). 
10 Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt & Katherine W. Phillips, When What You 
Know Is Not Enough: Expertise and Gender Dynamics in Task Groups, 
30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1585, 1594 (2004). 
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assignments. Women of all races report doing much more 
administrative work (planning parties, cleaning up the 
cups, taking notes at a meeting, finding a time to meet, 
sending the follow-up email), emotional work (being the 
peacemaker), and undervalued work (making the 
PowerPoint for someone else to present, doing the task 
list for a litigator, coordinating signatures for a corporate 
lawyer) than men do.11 
• Women and people of color are interrupted far more than 
white men are and are given fewer speaking turns.  
 
3. Maternal Wall.12 Bias against mothers is the strongest and 
most pervasive form of gender discrimination. Maternal-wall bias 
has been documented for nearly 20 years. Latinas and white 
women are the most likely to report it. Maternal-wall bias 
commonly shows up as follows: 
 
• Mothers are assumed to be no longer committed to their 
jobs. 
• Mothers are not given career-enhancing work. 
• Mothers are assumed to be less capable at their jobs, e.g., 
“pregnancy brain.” 
• Mothers who are competent are disliked and held to 
higher performance standards. 
• Fathers who play an active role in family care are treated 
as no longer competent or committed; research shows that 
this “flexibility stigma” is in fact a “femininity stigma”—
which means that it is sex discrimination.13 
 
 
11 Linda Babcock, Maria P. Recalde, Lise Vesterlund & Laurie Weingart, 
Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with 
Low Promotability, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 714, 744 (2017).  
12 For a thorough review of the literature on maternal-wall bias, see 
Williams et al., supra note 1. 
13 Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a 
Family Leave: Is Flexibility Stigma a Femininity Stigma?, 69 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 322, 329 (2013). 
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4. Tug of War.14 Some bias against a group fuels conflicts 
within it. Tug-of-war bias has been studied since for at least 15 
years. Common examples of tug-of-war bias include the 
following: 
 
• Women or people of color undercut each other for the one 
“diversity slot.” 
• Women join the “boys club” and align with the men 
against other women, or people of color align with white 
colleagues against colleagues of their own group, in order 
to be accepted by the majority. 
• Women or people of color do not advocate for others of 
their group due to fear that it will look like favoritism. 
• Women or people of color hold members of their group to 
higher standards due to fear that poor performance by 
another member of their group will reflect poorly on 
them. 
• Women professionals report that they have trouble getting 
administrative staff to do for them the kind of things that 
they readily do for men.  
 
5. Racial Stereotypes. Some bias is specific to race: 
 
• Asians are seen as good at technical skills but not suited 
to leadership.15 
• Latino/as are seen as “hot-blooded,” prone to theft or 
violence, or lazy.16 
• Black people are seen as “intimidating” or “threatening” 
and are treated with startling disrespect.17 
 
 
14 For a thorough review of the literature on tug-of-war bias, see 
Williams et al., supra note 1. 
15 Lei Lai & Linda C. Babcock, Asian Americans and Workplace 
Discrimination: The Interplay Between Sex of Evaluators and the 
Perception of Social Skills, 34 J. ORG. BEHAV. 310, 312 (2013). 
16 WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 7, at 208.  
17 Ashleigh Shelby Rosette, Christy Zhou Koval, Anyi Ma & Robert 
Livingston, Race Matters for Women Leaders: Intersectional Effects on 
Agentic Deficiencies and Penalties, 27 LEADERSHIP Q. 429, 439 (2016).  
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Title VII Applies to These Patterns. 
 
These contemporary forms of racial and gender 
discrimination fit into Title VII. Tightrope bias was the type of 
bias at issue in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: a hard-driving 
woman was seen as unqualified for partnership because she was 
insufficiently feminine.18 Subsequent courts have followed suit.19  
Stereotyping evidence typically relies on comparators 
(similarly situated members of an unprotected group) and has been 
used to establish tightrope bias,20 especially when women and 
people of color have less access to desirable work assignments;21 
to establish prove-it-again bias, when women and people of color 
are presumed incompetent;22 and maternal-wall bias,23 although 
the Supreme Court has clarified that discrimination against 
mothers is straightforward sex discrimination.24 Stereotyping 
evidence typically—but not necessarily—involves comments.25 
Other evidence can be used to establish tug-of-war bias. For 
example, Twymon v. Well Fargo involved a Black Director of 
Employee Relations counseling another employee to develop a 
deferential persona as a “good Black” who “would be accepted by 
 
18 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
19 Margolis v. Tektronix, Inc., 44 F. App’x 138, 141–42 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Casella v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 2009 WL 1621411, at *14 n. 24 (D. Me. 
2009); Collins v. Cohen Pontani Lieberman & Pavane, 2008 WL 
2971668, at *10 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Kahn v. Fairfield Univ., 357 F. 
Supp. 2d 496, 498–99 (D. Conn. 2005). 
20 Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 771 (E.D. 
Wis. 2010). 
21 EEOC v. Schott N. Am., Inc., 2009 WL 310897, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. 
2009); Collins, 2008 WL 2971668, at *10 n.24, *16. 
22 Thomas, 183 F.3d at 59; Kimble, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 771. 
23 Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 
(2d Cir. 2004). 
24 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1743 (2020). 
25 E.g., EEOC v. Bob Evans Farms, 275 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640 (W.D. Pa. 
2017) (awarding summary judgment to the plaintiff, despite the lack of 
explicit statements, because the employer had given the pregnant 
employee zero hours). 
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the Caucasians at Wells Fargo.”26 The plaintiff responded by 
asking if she should act like an Uncle Tom.27 
 
Expert Testimony is Not Required to Establish Bias. 
 
The Supreme Court, in Price Waterhouse, was careful to 
signal that plaintiffs do not need expert testimony to introduce 
evidence of stereotyping: 
 
Indeed, we are tempted to say that Doctor Fiske’s expert 
testimony was merely icing on Hopkins’ cake. It takes no 
special training to discern sex stereotyping and a description of 
an aggressive female employee as requiring “a course at charm 
school.” Nor . . . Require expertise and psychology to note that, 
if an employee’s flawed “interpersonal skills” can be corrected 
by a soft hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the 
employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn 
the criticism.28 
 
The same is true of all five patterns of bias. Each pattern has 
been widely recognized in popular culture, such that any 
reasonable jury can be expected to be able to recognize these 
patterns without the need for expert testimony. Assessing whether 
bias has occurred involves a series of judgments by the factfinder 
as to whether the plaintiff has been treated differently than the 
comparator, whether that treatment was because of sex/race or 
because of something else, and whether comments involve 
stereotyping. 
 
Women of Color and Other “Intersectional Plaintiffs” 
 
Women of color report high levels of prove-it-again bias, 
tightrope bias, and tug-of-war bias. They often spend time trying 
to figure out whether they are having to prove themselves over 
and over again because they are women or because they are people 
of color. Courts have sometimes struggled with cases involving 
 
26 Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 936 (8th Cir. 2006).  
27 Id. at 931. 
28 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256. 
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women of color or other “intersectional plaintiffs” for fear of 
creating an infinite regression of protected categories.29  
Given that both racial and gender discrimination are illegal, 
this angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin inquiry is unnecessary. Evidence 
from the Workplace Experiences Survey shows that women of 
color are often treated differently from both men of color and 
white women. More to the point: the key comparator for women 
of color should be white men. 
 
The Same-Actor Inference  
 
The “same-actor inference” stems from the 1991 Fourth 
Circuit case of Proud v. Stone.30 Proud involved the firing of an 
accountant, within 4½ months of the time he was hired, by the 
supervisor who hired him; the court reasoned that it would seem 
unlikely that the same person who hired the plaintiff would then 
have discriminated against him shortly after.31 Subsequent cases 
greatly expanded the doctrine. By 2008, the First, Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had held that the 
same-actor inference was an almost-irrebuttable presumption,32 
often leading courts to grant employers’ motions for summary 
judgment even when people other than the discriminator had 
played a role in the plaintiff’s hiring.33  
This expanded same-actor inference suffers from several 
fallacies. First, when the hiring decision is made by a group 
different from the firing decision, no inference should lie. Second, 
the same-actor inference ought to be per se inapplicable in cases 
involving maternal-wall bias when the employee is hired prior to 
having children. Third, the tug-of-war bias indicates that people 
of color can take dramatically different approaches for 
 
29 See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
30 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991). 
31 Id. at 797. 
32 See Andrea L. Miller, The Use (and Misuse) of the Same-Actor 
Inference in Family Responsibilities Discrimination Litigation: Lessons 
from Social Psychology on Flexibility Stigma, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1032, 1073 (2015). 
33 Id. at 1066–67, 1070–71. 
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assimilating, or refusing to assimilate, into the white majority.34 A 
supervisor of color could hire other persons of color but then 
discriminate against them because they are too deferential, or 
undeferential, to the white majority. The same goes for women 
and their relationship to the “boys club.” 
 
The Personal-Animosity Defense  
 
The personal-animosity defense is available when an adverse 
employment action stems not from discrimination but from 
personal animosity.35 As the data reveal, the problem with this 
defense is that, often, personal animosity goes hand-in-hand with 
unlawful discrimination. White men get a pass for behavior that, 
for women, would be held against them as difficult, abrasive, 
lacking in social skills or polish, etc. This is classic gender bias of 
the type decried in the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse. 
Similarly, tightrope bias means that people of color may be 
criticized as difficult, out of control, or threatening for behavior 
readily accepted in white men. In these situations, personal dislike 




Five common patterns of bias are pervasive in practice and 
widely recognized in the social-science literature. Understanding 
those patterns can lead to better application of the Title VII and 
other antidiscrimination statutes in court.  
 
34 Twymon, 462 F.3d at 936.  
35See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity 
Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003); Ann C. McGinley, Viva La Evolucion!: 
Recognizing Unconscious Motives in Title VII, CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 415 (2000). 
